Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic Volume 25, Number 3, July 1984 Skolem Fragments DANIEL BONEVAC* W. V. Quine splits the fundamental question of ontology-What is there?-into two questions: What does a theory say that there is? and What theories ought we adopt? Of these, only the former seems amenable to philosophical treatment. Quine thus attempts to formulate an adequate criterion of ontological commitment. Syntactically, the initially existentially quantified sentences of a theory appear to constitute the locus of its ontological commitments (cf. [5] , [2] , [3] , and [1] ). Semantically, however, Quine offers at least three criteria of commitment: a theory is committed to (1) the objects in the domain of its intended model (cf. [4] ); (2) the objects in the domain of its intended model that cannot be eliminated by means of proxy functions (cf. [6] ); or (3) the objects in the domain of every model of it (or to objects of kinds such that some objects of those kinds are in each of its models) (cf. [7] ). In this paper I shall show that Quine's syntactic criterion corresponds to and, indeed, follows from the third semantic criterion.
Any philosopher using a syntactic criterion of ontological commitment such as Quine's that determines commitments according to sentences of the form 3x { ...3x n B must hold that the commitments of a theory are exactly those of its fragment consisting of initially existentially quantified sentences. I shall call this portion of a theory its Skolem fragment.
What is the semantic relation between a theory and its Skolem fragment? In standard logic, they are equivalent. If our logic allows vacuous quantification, then any formula A is equivalent to 3xA, where 'x' does not occur free in A. Furthermore, any exclusive logic counts lx(x = x) valid, thus ruling out a null domain. For any formula A in a theory T, therefore, the equivalent *I am grateful to the Center for Cognitive Science of the University of Texas at Austin for its research support during my work on this project. [1] that we can characterize ontological commitment only by taking empty domains into account. A sentence makes an ontological commitment only if it forces an object into the domain; anything making such a commitment, therefore, must come out false on the null domain. Provided that we employ an inclusive logic and regard vacuous quantification as ill-formed, the Skolem fragment of a theory will not in general be equivalent to the theory itself. But I shall show that, if we measure commitment semantically by criterion (3) above, any theory and its Skolem fragment have identical ontological commitments. A theory's Skolem fragment forces into the domain any object forced into the domain by the theory as a whole.
Preliminaries
I shall begin by defining a first-order language L as having a countable set of individual variables, represented metalinguistically by 'x\ with or without subscripts; a countable set of individual constants, represented metalinguistically by 'a\ with or without subscripts; and a finite or countable set of H-ary predicate constants for each n > 0. Any individual constant or variable is a term. An tf-ary predicate followed by n terms is a formula; if A and B are formulas, so are ~A and {A & B). If A is a formula with free variable JC, then 3x4 and Vx4 for formulas too. Every formula is constructible by a finite number of applications of these rules. If L contains the additional condition that, if t and V are terms, then / = t' is a formula, L is & first-order language with identity. Any formula of L containing no free variable is a sentence. I shall define the valuation function from formulas of L into truth values as follows. Each formula of L has as its interpretation a set of models which, intuitively, make it true. where B may or may not contain additional quantifier occurrences. Say that S is k-satisfiable just in case S has a model with a domain of cardinality k. The least cardinal k such that S is /r-satisfiable is the spectrum number of S (symbolically, $5$). If S lacks identity as a logical primitive, then S will have models of cardinality k for every k>%S%. In these terms, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem says that there is no set S of sentences of L such that $S$ > K o .
Quine's third semantic criterion specifies that, for any formula A with a single free variable x, and any set of
sentences S, S is ontologically committed to As if and only if [ [S] ] <Ξ [ [3x4] ]
. That is, S makes an ontological commitment to As just in case there are As in every model of S. Quine does not speak of commitments to a certain cardinality of objects in a domain, but the criterion extrapolates easily. If, in every model of S, there is at least one A 9 then S is ontologically committed to As. S is ontologically committed to n As if and only if every Me [[S] ] contains at least n As. More generally, S is ontologically committed to n objects (or, to a domain of cardinality n) if and only if, for every ME [ [S] ], \D\ > n. Note that, if S is committed to n objects or As, S is committed to m objects or As for any m<n.\ shall say that n is the cardinality of S's commitments {to As) just in case S is ontologically committed to n objects (or As) but not to m objects (or As) for any m > n. It 
Lemmas
Let S be the Skolem fragment of a theory T. Obviously SQ T,
. Thus, if S has no models with domains of cardinality n < k, T has no such models. Similarly, if S has no models with fewer than n As, neither does T. So %T% > $5$ and $77,4$ > $SΛ4$.
Lemma 1
For any theory T such that 1 < %T% < K o , there is a set of sentences S* such that: (a) $5*$ = $Γ$, (b) S* g Γ, and (c) each AeS* has the form 3jCχ... 3x n B.
Proof: Suppose that L is a first-order language with identity. Define the following sets of sentences of L: If L lacks identity, we can define the sets similarly:
where A, B, C, etc., are expressions of L with one free variable. It is easy to demonstrate the existence of expressions fulfilling the appropriate role. Say that two objects x and y are weakly discriminable in language L just in case there is an expression A of L in one free variable such that A (x) & -A(y). Since this is the weakest possible grade of discriminability (cf. [8] ), any theory committed to the existence of n objects must be able to discriminate them, pairwise, in this sense. But that requires (n 2 -n)/2 expressions, having the characteristics that the above definition of S n requires. Clearly $5*$ = $Π, 5* c T, and each member of S* has the correct form. By obvious alterations of these definitions, we can derive:
Lemma 2
For any theory T such that 1 < $ΓΛ4$ < K o , there is a set of sentences SX such that: (a) $5^Λ4$ = $T/A$, (b) 5^ c T, and each member of SX has the form 3x x ... 3x n B. 
Lemma 3 If M is an A-minimal model of T, then M is an

Theorem 7 The cardinality of a theory's commitments (to As) is identical to its Skolem fragment's commitments (to As),
Theorem 8
For any cardinal k, a theory is k-satisfiable just in case its Skolem fragment is k-satisfiable.
Theorem 9
For any cardinal k, a theory is ontologically committed to k objects or As if and only if its Skolem fragment is ontologically committed to k objects (or As).
Theorem 10
A theory T is free from commitment to As if and only if 3xA £ T.
Theorem 11 For any theory T, the following are equivalent: (a) T is free from ontological commitment; (b) T is O-satisfiable; and (c) T's Skolem fragment is empty.
If we adopt Quine's third semantic criterion of ontological commitment, then the ontological commitments of a theory are determined by the theory's Skolem fragment, the set of its initially existentially quantified sentences. The theory's Skolem fragment determines not only whether the theory is committed to, say, As, but also to how many As the theory is committed. The semantic approach to commitment I have outlined thus accords especially well with a syntactic emphasis on initial existential quantification. We can see, nevertheless, why Quine has tended increasingly toward semantic criteria involving intended interpretations, background languages, etc. The approach of this paper implies that no first-order theory is ontologically committed to more than countably many objects. Since Quine holds both that first-order languages are the canonical notation of science and that uncountable collections constitute the chief source of ontology's interest, he needs an account of ontological commitment more complex than the rather direct analysis I have tried to explicate.
